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Insufficient Causes
David A. Fischer'
I. INTRODUCTION
C OURTS have long used the "but-for" test to determine causation in
fact in tort cases. Unable to adequately deal with difficult cases such
as those involving over-determined causes, the test has always required
supplementation. Thus, in the last century, courts used the "substantial
factor" test to complement the but-for test. Over the years, courts also used
the substantial factor test to do an increasing variety of things it was never
intended to do and for which it is not appropriate.' As a result, the test
now creates unnecessary confusion in the law and has outlived its useful-
ness. The NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set) test of causation,
popularized by Professor Richard Wright,3 is emerging as the new supple-
ment to the but-for test for the twenty-first century. Momentum in favor
of the NESS test is building. Indeed, several prestigious scholars now ad-
vocate some version of the NESS test,4 and the American Law Institute's
new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm replaces the
substantial factor test with a version of the NESS test.' Much of the focus
of twenty-first century causation scholarship will explore the strengths and
weaknesses of the NESS test.
I James Lewis Parks Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. This article
benefited greatly from the following: The comments of Liz Fischer, Michael Green, Chris
Guthrie, Jane Stapleton, Richard Wright, and the participants in Jane Stapleton's seminar on
causation and responsibility at the University of Texas School of Law who read early drafts
of the manuscript; workshops at the University of Missouri--Columbia and at the Research
School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University; and research help from
Michael Gardner. All mistakes, however, are mine. The work on this article was supported by
a grant from the University of Missouri Law School Foundation.
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. j and
Reporters' Note cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. , 2005).
3 See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985) [hereinafter
Wright, Causation].
4 See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, LegalCause: Cause-in-Fact andthe Scope ofLiabilityforConsequences,
54 VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001) (Professor Stapleton's version of the NESS test is the "targeted
but-for test.").
5 RESTATEMENT ('-IRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. c, § 27 cmts.
f,i.
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This article analyzes two types of tort cases that, because the tortious
conduct is not "independently sufficient" to cause injury, present particu-
larly perplexing causation-in-fact questions. The article evaluates the use-
fulness of the NESS test for resolving these questions.
By "independently sufficient," I refer to situations where there is more
than one causal force of interest, each sufficient in the absence of the other
to produce the result. For example, each of two fires is independently suf-
ficient to destroy a building if each would have destroyed the building in
the absence of the other fire. Keep in mind, however, that although each
of two causal forces (such as the fires) may be sufficient in the absence of
the other, all causes (including the fires) are dependent on other existing
factors without which the injury would not occur. A fire, for example, is
dependent on fuel and oxygen to continue burning. A fire, therefore, can
be sufficient to cause harm in the absence of another fire, but it cannot be
sufficient to cause harm in the absence of other factors such as fuel, oxygen,
wind, and the absence of a downpour. Therefore, I use the phrase "inde-
pendently sufficient" in the limited sense of being sufficient in the absence
of the other cause of interest. I use "insufficient" contribution to injury to
refer to contributions not "independently sufficient" to cause injury in the
absence of the contribution of the other cause of interest. An "insufficient"
contribution to injury is sufficient to cause injury only when combined with
some or all of the contribution of the other cause of interest. In this sense,
a fire made an "insufficient" contribution to the destruction of a building
only if it would have burned the building when combined with another
fire. That is, heat from the first fire would not have ignited the building by
itself but would ignite the building when combined with some (or all) of
the heat supplied by the second fire.
The first problem case that this article analyzes involves forces or condi-
tions neither necessary nor independently sufficient to produce plaintiff's
injury. The difficult question is whether such forces caused the injury. The
following hypothetical illustrates the problem:
Stream Pollution
Two actors independently and simultaneously discharge pollution into a
stream. Actor X discharges twenty-five units of pollution and actor Y dis-
charges one unit. The combined pollution kills plaintiff's cow that drank
from the stream. A minimum of fifteen units of pollution were necessary to
6
kill the cow.
Clearly, actor X killed the cow. Has actor Y also killed the cow? Should our
view of Y's causal contribution change if she were one of twenty-six actors
6 This stream-pollution hypothetical is based on a variation of the facts in Warren v.
Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1904).
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with each actor contributing one unit of pollution? In both cases, actor Y's
pollution was insufficient and unnecessary to kill the cow.
Courts sometimes find insufficient and unnecessary contributions to
be causal. At other times they do not. When should courts find such con-
tributions causal? The question is important because there are numerous
situations where actors make insufficient and unnecessary contributions to
disastrous events. Injury caused by toxic substances is a prime example.
The second problem case in which causal forces lack independent suffi-
ciency occurs with multiple omissions where no omission is independently
sufficient to be a "but-for" cause of the resulting injury. For example, one
actor fails to repair a car's defective brakes, and a second actor fails to apply
the car's brakes, resulting in injury to a bystander because the car did not
stop. As I explain later,7 in such cases each omission is insufficient to be a
"but-for" cause of the result because the other omitted act was necessary
for sufficiency. In this article, I refer to such omissions as "dependently
sufficient causes." The omissions are "dependently sufficient" since their
sufficiency depends on the existence of the other omitted act.8 These cases
are surprisingly common with product liability failure-to-warn cases as the
leading example. Professor Wright and I have joined issue concerning the
appropriate analysis of these cases. 9 My analysis reveals a key weakness
of the NESS test: its inability to adequately identify when one potential
cause preempts another.
This article first briefly reviews the operation of the basic tests for de-
termining causation. It then analyzes the two problem cases.
II. BAsic TESTS OF CAUSATION
A. The "But-For" Test
The predominant test for causation is the "but-for" test, a test of necessity.
It finds that damage is caused by an act or omission if the damage would
not have occurred at the time it occurred without the act or omission.'0 For
7 See infra notes 112-14, i16-19, 134 and accompanying text.
8 I recognize this label is not ideal because, as pointed out above, all causes are depen-
dent on other existing factors, without which the injury would not occur The cases under
consideration are distinguishable, however, because the sufficiency of the omissions in such
cases is also dependent on the existence of a tortiously omitted act that did not occur. See infra
notes 114-16, 1 18-21, 139 and accompanying text.
9 See David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335 (1992)
[hereinafter Fischer, Causation]; Wright, Causation, supra note 3; Richard W. Wright, Once More
into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAD. L.
REV. 1071 (2ooI) [hereinafter Wright, Once More].
1o Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp., 916 P.zd 122, 139 (Mont. 1996).
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example, a fire caused a house to burn down if the house would not have
burned at the time it burned without the fire. Causation in such a case is
not negated simply because the house would have been destroyed by an-
other fire-or other force-at a later time."
In an exceptional situation, courts decline to apply the but-for test,
holding tortfeasors liable whose conduct, unnecessary for the result, is not
causal under the test. The situation arises when two actively operating
forces concur, each independently sufficient to cause the injury.'2 The "two
fires" case, set out below, is a classic example:
Two Fires
X and Y each light separate fires that merge into a single fire. The merged
fire burns down plaintiff's house.
Here, application of the "but-for" test would exonerate both X and Y if
each fire were large enough to burn the house by itself. X's fire was not
causal. Even in the absence of X's fire, the house would have been burned
by Y's fire. Y's fire is also not a but-for cause since, in the absence of Y's fire,
X's fire would still have burned the house. Courts have dealt with this logi-
cal dilemma by not applying the but-for test and holding both tortfeasors
liable."
Courts often impose liability in such cases by applying the "substan-
tial factor" test as an alternative for the but-for test. 4 This alternative test
requires a finding that the tortious conduct was a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the result as the basis for proving causation." The test offers no real
t i Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. i i i (N.H. 1932). In Dillon, a defendant
who negligently electrocuted a boy was deemed.to have caused his death even if the jury were
to find that, if he had not been electrocuted, he would have fallen to his death shortly after the
time of the electrocution. The boy's probable future death by falling was, however, a basis for
reducing the damages caused by electrocution. Id. at 114-15. For a discussion of the relevance
of the other forces in reducing the damages the tortfeasor has to pay, see David A. Fischer,
Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1127 (1999) [hereinafter
Fischer, Duplicated Harm].
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965) (stating the rule).
13 See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417,429-30 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that
the trial court should have instructed the jury on causation using the "substantial factor" test);
Koenig v. Babka, 682 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Kingston v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co.,
211 N.W. 913,915 (Wis. 1927).
14 See, e.g., Basko, 416 F.2d at 429-3o; Thomsen v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co., 45 Cal.
Rptr. 642, 647 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Kyriss v. State, 707 P.zd 5, 8-9 (Mont. 1985). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted the substantial factor test, and applies it in all cases,
including those where there is causation under the but-for test. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 431-32 (1965). It provides that, with one exception, conduct cannot be a substantial
factor unless it is also a but-for cause. The exception applies where there are two actively
operating forces, each of which is sufficient to bring about the result. Id. § 432.
15 Basko, 416 F.2d at 429; Thomsen, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
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guidance for determining when a factor is substantial or even a "factor."
Courts and juries must rely on intuition to decide the issue.
Courts and scholars frequently explain the exception to the but-for
test as applying when the competing forces are independently sufficient
to cause the injury. Accordingly, the exception apparently becomes rel-
evant only in the case of "multiple sufficient causes." In the example,
each fire is independently sufficient to.cause the injury since it would burn
the house in the absence of the other fire. Under this view, a force is causal
either if it is necessary (meets the but-for test) or is independently suffi-
cient for the harm (sufficient in the absence of the other cause of interest),
but an unnecessary and insufficient force contributing to harm is not causal.
In the stream pollution case, therefore, actor Y's unit of pollution was not
a cause of the cow's death because it was neither necessary nor indepen-
dently sufficient to kill the cow. One version of the NESS test of causation
also finds that Y's unit of pollution did not kill the cow. Another version
of the NESS test finds the opposite on the basis that an unnecessary and
insufficient contribution to harm is causal. Where the latter view prevails,
the exception from the but-for requirement is more accurately described
as involving "overdetermined causes" rather than "multiple sufficient"
causes because Y's pollution was insufficient.
B. The "NESS" Test
NESS stands for "Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set." Hart and Hon-
or6 originated the test; '9 Professor Wright elaborated on it. The test is a real
contribution to legal analysis. It provides an extremely helpful way of con-
ceptualizing the nature of causal problems, and it offers a rational process
for identifying causes in overdetermined-cause cases.
In his landmark 1985 article, Professor Wright described the NESS test
as follows: "[A] particular condition was a cause of (condition contributing
to) a specific consequence if and only if it was a necessary element of a set
of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of
the consequence." 20 The test resolves the two fires hypothetical by find-
ing both fires caused the injury because "[elach fire was necessary for the
sufficiency of a set of actual antecedent conditions that did not include the
16 E.g., W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 266, 268 (5th ed.
1984).
17 See ALEXANDER PECZENIK, CAUSES AND DAMAGES 15 (1979) (employing "multiple suf-
ficient cause" terminology); see generally Fischer, Causation, supra note 9.
I8 Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1777.
19 See generally H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORf, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
20 Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1790.
2oo5-2oo6]
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other fire." 2' Professor Wright emphasizes that the set must be comprised
of "existing antecedent conditions."
2 2
Professor Wright uses the two fires case to illustrate the necessity of
independently sufficient conditions that have not been counteracted by
positive or negative conditions. He states:
The NESS test can be used, and implicitly is used, to confirm the indepen-
dent sufficiency of each fire in cases such as Kingston, in which the two large
fires merged to burn down the plaintiff's house. Each fire was necessary for
the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that contained it
but not the other fire. The two sets overlap to a considerable extent, since
they share such existing necessary conditions as oxygen, fuel to burn on the
route to the house, lack of a downpour, the fire's reaching the house while
there is still a house left to burn, etc. Since the set containing each fire was
fully instantiated, the two fires are duplicative causes of the destruction of
the plaintiff's property. 
3
III. THE FIRST PROBLEM CASE: UNNECESSARY AND
INSUFFICIENT CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Theory
Consider the variation of the stream pollution hypothetical set out above
where each of twenty-six actors contributes unnecessary and insufficient
amounts of pollution to kill the cow. Hart and Honord, the originators of
21 Id. at 1791.
a2 Wright, Once Afore, supra note 9, at 1105 n. 116 (emphasis added). In this article
Professor Wright discusses the sense in which he uses the term "antecedent."
[Honore] describes his version of the NESS test as being only "marginally
different" than my version, insofar as I might require that there be a
time gap between each antecedent condition and the consequent, rather
than allowing, as he does, at least some of the antecedent conditions
to persist to the time when the consequent occurs. I did not mean to
exclude such persistence, or even (the theoretical or science-fiction
possibility of) backward-in-time causation, although it is useful and in
accord with practical reality to think of the word "antecedent" in the
NESS test in terms of temporal priority (which does not exclude but
rather often assumes persistence of the temporally prior condition up to
and even beyond the time that the consequent occurs). What I mean to
emphasize by the word "antecedent" is that the condition appears in the
antecedent ("if" part) of the causal law or generalization, rather than in
the consequent ("then" part).
Id.
23 Wright, OnceMore, supra note 9, at 1o4 (citing Kingston v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 211
N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)).
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the NESS test, apparently would not find insufficient contributions to be
causal.24 Professor Wright modified the NESS test in such a way as to find
them causal. He explains in the following passage:
[Tihe NESS test explains and justifies our common judgment in the War-
ren case that each of the twenty-six defendants' independent discharges of
sewage was a cause of (contributed to) the destruction of the downstream
plaintiff's use of his property, even though each individual's discharge by it-
self was "merely nominal" and would not have resulted in any injury to the
plaintiff. Clearly, no individual defendant's discharge was independently
sufficient for the occurrence of the plaintiff's injury. Although it is not ex-
plicitly stated by the court, it also seems clear that no individual defendant's
discharge was necessary for the occurrence of the plaintiff's injury. Yet each
defendant's discharge was a NESS condition. Some total number of dis-
charges, N, where Nis much greater than one but less than twenty-six, was
necessary and sufficient for the plaintiff's injury. Each defendant's discharge
was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions
which includes N-i of the other defendants' discharges, and the sufficiency
of that set was not preempted, but rather was reinforced, by the 26-Nother
defendants' discharges that were not included in the description of the suf-
ficient set.
As a matter of empirical causal contribution, the analysis should not and
would not change if there were only two defendants, one of whom pro-
duced N of the discharges (the necessary and sufficient amount), and the
other of whom produced the remaining 26-N. The first defendant's N dis-
charges were independently sufficient. The second defendant's 26-N dis-
charges would also be independently sufficient if N is thirteen or less. If
N is greater than thirteen (e.g., fifteen), the second defendant's 26-N (e.g.,
eleven) discharges were necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing an-
tecedent conditions which includes, in addition to the second defendant's
26-N (e.g., eleven) discharges, N-(26-N) (e.g., four) of the first defendant's
discharges. Again, the sufficiency of this set was not preempted but rather
was reinforced by the N-(N-(26-N)) (e.g., eleven) of the first defendant's
discharges that were not included in the description of the sufficient set.
A non-numerical way of presenting the analysis in the preceding paragraph
is to describe the minimally sufficient set containing the second defendant's
total discharge as a set which also contains a total discharge by the first
defendant "at least large enough" to ensure that the antecedent of the ap-
plicable causal generalization is fully instantiated. Given this description of
the first defendant's total discharge, the second defendant's total discharge
was necessary for the sufficiency of the set and thus is a NESS condition.
Again, the portion of the first defendant's total discharge that is left out of
24 HART & HONOR9, supra note 19, at 123-24, 125, 2o6-07, 235-39, 245, 249.
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this description did not preempt, but rather reinforced, the sufficiency of
the described set. The same method of analysis can be used to establish
that the defendant's fire in Anderson and each of the two defendants' noisy
motorcycles in Corey were, if not independently sufficient conditions, nev-
ertheless still NESS conditions for the occurrence of the plaintiff's injury in
each of those cases. This analytic method is not a verbal trick or sleight-of-
hand. The description of the competing fire as a fire "at least" so big or of
the competing motorcycle noise as "at least" so loud is a factual description
of an antecedent condition that was concretely instantiated on the particu-
lar occasion.2-
To state the theory in a nontechnical way, an unnecessary and insuf-
ficient force or condition is a cause of injury if it joins with other forces or
conditions to contribute to an injury. In the stream-pollution hypothetical,
all the units of pollution mixed together equally aiding the cow's death by
poisoning although no unit individually hastened the death of the cow.
B. Case Law
There indeed are some cases in which courts impose liability on actors
who make insufficient and unnecessary contributions to an injury. War-
ren v. Parkhurst (involving stream pollution), described above by Professor
Wright,26 is an example but not a pure example. Warren was a nuisance case
involving both causation of injury and causation of harm. The Restatement
(Second) defines "injury" as the "invasion of any legally protected interest
of another."" It defines "harm" as "loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a
person resulting from any cause. ' '2S Consequently, injury can occur without
harm (a transitory trespass), and harm can occur without injury (a loss of
profits due to a business downturn). 9 Warren is not a pure example be-
cause, while the contribution of each defendant was not sufficient to cause
injury (the nuisance), it apparently was necessary to cause some harm (suf-
fering due to stench).
In Warren, the injury was the nuisance which required a fixed threshold
of stench to be actionable. No tortfeasor's contribution was either neces-
sary or independently sufficient to cause the nuisance. The fixed threshold
of stench was not reached by any one discharge of sewage, but it was ex-
25 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at i io6-07. The three cases mentioned here are
Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (N.Y. Gen. Term I9o4); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul
& Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920), overruled in part by Borsheim v. Great N.
Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (Minn. 192 1); and Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 19o2).
26 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965).
28 Id. § 7(2).
29 Id. § 7 cmt. a.
[Vol. 94
INSUFFICIENT CAUSES
ceeded by the combined discharges. Each tortfeasor's discharge was neces-
sary, however, for some of plaintiff's harm because each discharge increased
the stench created by the other discharges. The plaintiff's harm was vari-
able not fixed (i.e., the greater the stench the greater the suffering). The
court appeared to recognize that no defendant's contribution was sufficient
to cause the injury (the nuisance) but each contribution was necessary to
cause some harm (suffering). The court said:
The only injury to the plaintiff arises from the foulness of the stream at his
place. No one defendant caused that injury; all of the defendants did cause
it.... All of the defendants may be enjoined, and if the question of damages
is urged a reference may be had to determine what damage has been caused
by each defendant.
30
Pure examples of liability based on unnecessary and insufficient con-
tributions are cases permitting recovery for fixed harm. In Tidal Oil Co.
v. Pease,3' some tortfeasors polluted one stream with saltwater and other
tortfeasors polluted another stream with saltwater. Plaintiff's cattle drank
water from both streams and died. Apparently no evidence was presented
as to the amount of water each cow drank from each stream. Plaintiff sued
the tortfeasors who polluted one of the streams. The court held defendants
liable for the entire harm. 3 The opinion reasoned as follows: each defen-
dant's negligence "combined" with the negligence of other tortfeasors to
cause a "single injury," and each was liable for the injury even though his
act alone "might not have caused it."33 The opinion did not require the de-
fendants' discharge of pollution to be necessary to kill the cows. It also did
not suggest the existence of any evidence supporting a finding of necessary
contribution by each defendant. Thus, defendants would be liable for the
death of a cow who took only an innocuous sip of water from a stream the
defendants polluted, though the sip may not have altered the time or man-
ner of death. The harm in TidalOilis fixed. Once the cow drank a fatal dose
of saltwater, any additional intake of saltwater did not increase the harm
caused by the cow's death. Each defendant could be liable even though his
pollution was neither necessary nor independently insufficient to cause the
death of any cow.34
30 Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725, 728 (N.Y. Gen Term. i9o4). Warren did not state
which party had the burden of proof with respect to apportioning damages. The modern trend
is to place the burden of proof on defendants to apportion damages. This approach holds
defendants liable for all harm if they cannot apportion. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat.
Steel Corp., 495 Ezd 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1974).
31 Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931).
32 Id. at 390, 393.
33 Id. at 391.
34 See also Northup v Eakes, 178 P. 266 (Okla. 1918). In Northup, numerous tortfeasors
discharged crude oil into a stream running though plaintiff's property. The oil caught fire and
2oo5-zoo6]
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Other cases also impose liability based on possibly unnecessary and in-
sufficient contributions to injury or harm. These cases involve such things
as two floods uniting to damage property,35 two fires uniting to damage,6
property, two loud noises uniting to cause an accident by frightening a
horse,37 multiple exposures to asbestos uniting to cause disease," and reli-
ance on a fraudulent misrepresentation uniting with other motives to cause
39
plaintiff to enter into a disadvantageous business transaction.
There are, however, other similar cases that appear inconsistent with
the cases described above. They impose liability for contributing to injury
or harm only if the contribution is either necessary or independently suf-
ficient to produce the injury or harm. These cases involve such things as
multiple discharges of smoke and fumes uniting to cause a nuisance,40 two
fires uniting to damage property,4' multiple servings of alcohol uniting to
42
cause intoxication resulting in an accident, reliance on a fraudulent mis-
representation uniting with other motives to cause plaintiff to enter into a
disadvantageous business transaction, 43 wrongful inducement to breach a
burned plaintiff's barn. Plaintiff sued some of the tortfeasors but not others. The court held
each defendant liable for the entire damage because his act "combined" to cause a single
injury even though his act "alone might not have caused it." Id. at 268. The opinion did not
require defendants' pollution to be necessary for a fire that would have destroyed plaintiff's
barn. Id.
35 Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N.Y. 138 (N.Y. 1876).
36 Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn.
i920), overruled in part by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (Minn. 192I).
37 Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 19o2).
38 Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 4Ii (7th Cir. 1992); Spaur v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 51o N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994).
39 Nails v. S & R, Inc., 639 A.2d 660 (Md. 1994) (reliance on fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion concerning size of sales commission and reliance on other accurate representations in-
duced plaintiffs to enter into employment contract with defendant); Horton v. Tyree, i39
S.E. 737 (W. Va. I9z7) (reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations and on a guarantee induced
plaintiff to buy coal stock).
40 Bollinger v. Am. Asphalt Roof Corp., 19 S.W.2d 544, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) ("If there
was enough of smoke and fumes definitely found to have come from defendant's plant to
cause perceptible injury to plaintiffs, then the fact that another person or persons also joined
in causing the injury would be no defense; and it was not necessary for the jury to find how
much smoke and fumes came from each place.").
41 Kingston v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., zI1 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927); Cook v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 74 N.W. 56I (Wis. 1898) (finding no liability where one
fire is of innocent origin).
42 Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F3d 1283, 1295-96 (3d Cir. 1994) (in regards to sale of
wine to a minor in violation of dram shop act, holding "no jury could reasonably conclude that
[the minor's] drinking of two gulps of wine.., sufficiently contributed to his intoxication to
have been a cause of the accident.").
43 Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 919 (Cal. 1997) (Necessity
required. Reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation (concerning an arbitration clause in a
health plan) and numerous other considerations unite to cause plaintiff's employer to adopt
[Vol. 94
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contract uniting with other factors to cause a party to breach her contractS • • 44 ... 41
with plaintiff, and exposure to multiple toxins uniting to cause a disease.
City of Piqua v. Mormis is another example. Defendant negligently con-
structed a pond with inadequate drainage outlets so it would have over-
flowed in an ordinary flood and damaged plaintiff's property. The pond,
however, was overwhelmed by a flood so large and unforeseeable that even
properly constructed drainage outlets would not have prevented the over-
flow. The court found that the negligent construction did not cause the
flood.47 Yet the inadequate drainage is a NESS cause if the backup of water
it produces is combined with just enough water to constitute a "normal"
flood.48
an employee health plan. Actual reliance occurs when a misrepresentation is ".an immedi-
ate cause of [a plaintiff's] conduct, which alters his legal relations,' and when, absent such
representation, 'he would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered into the contract or
other transaction."' (quoting Spinks v. Clark, 82 P. 45, 47 (Colo. 1905)); Safford v. Grout, izo
Mass. 20, 25 (Mass. 1876) (Necessity required. Reliance on defendant's fraudulent misrepre-
sentation of a person's credit and on plaintiff's own inquiries about the person's credit. The
appellate court approved an instruction telling the jury that if plaintiff would not have acted
"except for the defendant's representations, then they could recover, although they were in
part controlled by other influences, for which he was not responsible."); Strong v. Strong, 5
N.E. 799, 8oi (N.Y. 1886) (Necessity required. Reliance on defendant's fraudulent misrepre-
sentation and on misrepresentation of another person. Held:
It is not essential to a recovery in such an action that the alleged repre-
sentations should have been the exclusive cause inducing the plaintiff
to assent to the settlement, but if she would not have made the settle-
ment except for such representations, there is such a reliance thereon as
entitles her to maintain the action.)
44 Mina Inv. Holdings Ltd. v. Lefkowitz, 184 ER.D. 245, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Necessity
required. Wrongful inducement unites with party's predisposition to breach contract.); Gosden
v. Louis, 687 N.E.zd 48 I, 50 i (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (Necessity required. Wrongful inducement
unites with party's dissatisfaction with the quality of plaintiff's work to cause party to fire
plaintiff.).
45 Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.zd 398, 403 (Cal. 1999) (Sufficiency required.
"The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution
of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical. Thus, a force which plays only
an 'infinitesimal' or 'theoretical' part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substan-
tial factor, but a very minorforce that does cause harm is a substantial factor.") (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). The directions for use of the California substantial factor jury instruction
state that "but for" causation is usually required for conduct to be a substantial factor that
contributes to harm. There is an exception. "The 'but-for' test does not apply to concurrent
independent causes, which are multiple forces operating at the same time and independently,
each of which would have been sufficient by itself to bring about the same harm." JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 430 (2004).
46 City of Piqua v. Morris, 12o N.E. 300 (Ohio 1918).
47 Id. at 300, 303.
48 Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1425, 144o (2003) [hereinafter, Wright, Grounds and Extent].
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C. Analysis
i. "Causation" or "Policy" as Basis for Liability?-Some cases find insuf-
ficient forces contributing to injury causal, some do not. How do we rec-
oncile these two lines of authority? One line of cases could be the cor-
rect approach to causation and the other incorrect. Professor Wright holds
this view, claiming that insufficient forces contributing to injury are always
causal, 49 although they do not always give rise to liability due to policy
considerations.?° He claims his version of the NESS test (which combines
insufficient conditions with other conditions to make a sufficient set) is
correct and Hart and Honore's version of the NESS test (which apparently
does not combine such conditions) is incorrect.5 '
I disagree with Professor Wright on this theoretical point. True, causa-
tion in most common tort cases presents a pure question of fact divorced
from policy considerations. If we know a car hit a pedestrian and crushed his
leg, we intuitively understand the causal relationship between the impact
and the injury. Our understanding is based on common knowledge about
how physical forces operate in the world. We do not need to be told about
a formal "test" of causation for us to reach our conclusion. Science does not
create the tests of causation courts use. Courts and scholars devise these
tests to implement their views of how to resolve causal questions. Those
views are based either on intuition (or common understanding) about cau-
sation, policy considerations, or a combination of both factors. The tests
we devise work remarkably well, permitting us to objectively determine
causation (by simply applying the test) in the great majority of cases where
there is widespread agreement about causation such as those involving
the simple operation of physical forces. Yet the large variety of contexts
in which causation issues arise make the tests imperfect, sometimes caus-
ing undesirable results when applied mechanically. Not all causation ques-
tions are restricted to the simple operation of physical forces. Particularly
difficult cases arise at the boundaries of preemption and overdetermined
harm where competing physical forces are at work. These cases cannot be
resolved merely by observing the forces. Here, conclusions about causation
require judgments about which forces should be valued and which forces
should be ignored. In such cases courts should not reduce causation in fact
to a pure question of fact by applying a mechanical test. Here it is impos-
sible to create a mechanical test of causation to invariably reach desirable
results.
49 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at i io6-07.
50 Wright, Grounds and Extent, supra note 48, at 1449-5o.
51 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at ii 04-07.
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Professor Wright believes the "basic concept of causation, which we all
intuitively employ, is formalized in the NESS test."5' 2 Yet he offers no em-
pirical evidence, nor does he claim, that in all contexts, intuition generally
leads to the belief that insufficient forces contributing to injury are causal.
I believe cases involving insufficient forces contributing to injury are hard
cases on the periphery where there is no core understanding of causation.
Intuition varies as the context varies with respect to these very difficult
cases.
Because these cases fall outside the core understanding of causation,
courts should decide whether to impose liability on parties who make un-
necessary and insufficient contributions to injury by making judgments
based on either policy or intuition rather than on facts alone. In such cases,
the NESS test helps us visualize the nature of the problem, but it does not
help us make the underlying intuitive and value judgments that should
dictate the result. A court finding causation can articulate its conclusion in
terms of set theory by explaining how it aggregated forces in order to con-
struct a sufficient set. A court finding no causation can articulate its decision
by explaining how it did not aggregate forces. While set theory helps the
judge explain her decision, it does not help her decide whether to aggre-
gate forces.
Set theory does not require courts to be consistent. A court using the
NESS test could sometimes aggregate forces to construct a sufficient set,
while at other times decline to aggregate forces. For example, courts fre-
quently exonerate parties who make trivial insufficient contributions to in-
jury. 3 A court articulating such a decision in causal terms could explain a
trivial contribution as not causal based on it not being a "substantial factor"
in producing the result; therefore, it should not be combined with other
forces to make a sufficient set. On the other hand, the court could aggregate
forces when it believed the contribution was substantial.
Courts that want to be consistent in the way they apply the NESS test
can still retain great flexibility by using another doctrine such as proximate
cause as the vehicle for distinguishing cases. The proximate cause ratio-
nale for exonerating parties who make trivial contributions could be, for
example, that while there is causation in fact (because the court always ag-
gregates insufficient forces to make sufficient sets), there is no liability for
trivial contributions to injury as a matter of proximate cause.
The new Restatement employs a two-part approach similar to the one
described in the preceding paragraph. First, with some exceptions dis-
cussed below, it finds insufficient forces causal by aggregating them with
52 Wright, Grounds and Extent, supra note 48, at 1441.
53 RESTATEMENT ("hIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 36 (Proposed Final
Draft No. i, 2oo5).
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other forces to construct sufficient sets.-M Second, it uses a special scope of
liability rule to exempt from liability parties who make "[t]rivial contribu-
tions to overdetermined outcomes."" It splits the inquiry into two parts in
order to preserve causation in fact as a "largely objective iqury, 6 The
Reporters recognize that determining which contributions are trivial and
insubstantial is "a normative one rather than a factual one"57 based on "fair-
ness, equitable-loss distribution, and administrative cost."' 8
Because the split is essentially arbitrary, splitting the normative inquiry
from the factual inquiry can lead to absurd conclusions concerning causa-
tion. As further demonstrated in Part IV of this article, the really difficult
causation decisions are almost always based on either intuitive judgments
or value judgments incapable of being captured by a mechanical rule. The
new Restatement correctly takes no position with respect to some of the
more problematic results of inquiry splitting.
One problematic case is the Restatement example of a "negligently
constructed dam which would have collapsed in an ordinary flood [but is]
overwhelmed by a flood so large and unforeseeable that no dam would
have controlled it."5 9 The Restatement recognizes that "the negligent
construction of the dam could be characterized as [a cause] if one con-
ceptualizes [it] as combining with something less than the actual events
that occurred. Thus, a ... flood of normal proportions make[s] the ... dam [a]
factual cause[]."6' While I question the relevance of intuition to this causal
inquiry, my intuition tells me the negligence caused no injury at all as long
as the dam did not collapse sooner than a properly constructed dam would
have collapsed. The Restatement takes no position on whether the dam
caused the flood damage since a finding of causation is not supported by
the case law and may be counterintuitive.
This restraint is wise. The flood example can be altered to produce
increasingly implausible findings of causation. Suppose a party adds a tea-
spoon of water to a tsunami causing great destruction. An application of the
NESS test concludes the party caused all the destruction in the vicinity of
the teaspoon of water. It does this by aggregating the teaspoon of water,
with just enough other water, to create an injury-causing set. Almost every
item of damage would have its own unique set. Different amounts of wa-
ter would be required for each set, as the minimal amount of water suffi-
54 Id. § 27 cmts. f, g, i.
55 Id. § 36 cmt. b.
56 Id.
57 Id. at Reporters' Note, cmt. b.
58 Id. at cmt. b.
59 Id. § 27 cmt.i.
6o Id.
61 Id.
[Vol. 94
INSUFFICIENT CAUSES
cient to cause each distinct injury or harm would vary according to the size,
strength, and location of the person or property harmed. Thus, hundreds of
items of damage require hundreds of different sufficient sets. One could
construct these sets by using the following process:
x) Determine what item of tsunami damage required the least water to oc-
cur; ascertain the least amount of water necessary to cause the damage;
subtract one teaspoon of water from the amount; and add the remaining
water to a set containing the teaspoon of water. The set is sufficient to
cause the damage requiring the least water.
2) Keep adding water until the item of damage requiring the second-least
amount of water would occur; subtract one teaspoon of water from that
amount; and add the remaining water to a second set containing the tea-
spoon of water. The second set is sufficient to cause the damage requir-
ing the second-least amount of water.
3) Repeat the process until all damage is accounted for.
The process establishes causation of all damage caused by the teaspoon of
water. Yet, despite the remorseless logic of the NESS test, I find the con-
cept of a teaspoon of water destroying a large hotel positively bizarre.
A second problematic case occurs where one tortfeasor makes a nec-
essary and independently sufficient contribution to injury, and the other
tortfeasor makes an unnecessary and insufficient contribution. The Re-
statement wisely takes no position on whether the insufficient contribution
is causal. Suppose a utility company negligently maintains a utility pole
with only enough strength to withstand a six-mile-per-hour automobile im-
pact, whereas a sound utility pole would withstand a twelve-mile-per-hour
impact. A car going sixty miles per hour knocks the pole over onto plaintiff.
My intuition is that the weakness of the pole was not a cause of the injury
as long as a sound pole would have been knocked over in exactly the same
manner as the weak pole. Case law supports my view.63 Yet, the NESS test
can prove causation by creating a sufficient set including the weak pole
plus eleven percent of the car's speed, i.e., a car going at least seven miles
62 Id. § 27 cmt. f.
For example, one actor's contribution may be sufficient to bring about
the harm while another actor's contribution is only sufficient when com-
bined with some portion of the first actor's contribution. Whether the
second actor's contribution can be so combined into a sufficient causal
set is a matter on which this Restatement takes no position and leaves
to future development in the courts.
Id.
63 See Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391
, 399 (Mass. 198o); Gibson v. Garcia,
216 P.2d 1 19, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 195o).
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per hour.64 Policy considerations discussed below suggest the tortfeasor
who made the insufficient contribution should never be liable.6 s
Even though the Restatement two-part approach is awkward at times,
I agree with it for two practical reasons. First, I believe there are some
(rather rare) situations where courts should impose liability on a party who
made an insufficient contribution to injury. The Restatement causation
analysis permits liability in these cases. Second, the Restatement approach
facilitates its laudable objective of eliminating the "substantial factor" test
from our jurisprudence. Courts deciding causation on the basis of whether
an insufficient force is "trivial" are likely to continue to use the substan-
tial factor test (or something very much like it). Courts always finding in-
sufficient contributions to injury to be causal are more likely to abandon
the substantial factor test. Furthermore, while the two-part procedure is
strained at times, I doubt courts would frequently reach different results
by employing this test rather than reasoning only in terms of causation. For
these reasons, the Restatement's use of scope of liability to decide when
to impose liability for insufficient contributions is superior to an approach
using causation to decide when to impose liability.
2. When to Impose Liability?-a. One Tortfeasor.-When should courts im-
pose liability on wrongdoers who create forces that make unnecessary and
insufficient contributions to injury or harm? The weakest cases for liability
are those where all the other forces contributing to the injury are nontor-
tious, such as when a defendant makes an insufficient contribution to a
natural flood. 66 Neither of tort law's two main objectives---corrective justice
and deterrence---can be advanced by liability.
The desire to achieve corrective justice is a major objective of tort law.6 7
Courts implement corrective justice by measuring damages as the compen-
64 The Reporters to the Restatement recognize that the utility company's insufficient
contribution is causal under the NESS test. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HAuM § 27, Reporters' Note cmt. i (Proposed Final Draft No. I, 2005) (citing
Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.zd 391, 399 (Mass. i98o) as a contrary example).
65 See infra notes 66-ioo and accompanying text.
66 See City of Piqua v. Morris, 120 N.E. 300, 303 (Ohio 1918).
67 Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2350 (I99O). Aristotle first advanced the "notion of cor-
rective justice." The objective is to nullify gains and losses that arise between persons when
one person wrongfully injures the other. Id. at 2350, 2355. Many scholars in recent years have
emphasized corrective justice as a rationale for tort law. See PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Symposium, Corrective Justice and
Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IowA L. REV. 403 (1992). Corrective justice
scholars advocate widely divergent definitions of corrective justice. See Jules L. Coleman,
Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pts. 1 & 2), I LAw & PHIL. 371 (1982), 2 LAW &
PHIL. 5 (1983) (developing "foundational" principles to be used to devise specific rules for
resolving cases); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAtv. L. REV. 537,
543-56 (1972) (claiming that reciprocity of risk is the basis for corrective justice); Ernest J.
[Vol. 94
INSUFFICIENT CAUSES
sation necessary to put plaintiff in the position she would have occupied
if the tortious conduct had not occurred. Thus, they allow plaintiff to re-
cover only for losses that would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's
tortious conduct. Damages are not required to achieve corrective justice
in cases where defendant's insufficient contribution to harm has not made
plaintiff's condition worse. Here, damages represent a windfall with plain-
tiff already occupying the position she would have been in had the tort not
occurred.
The corrective justice measure of damages is nearly all-pervasive
with courts using it with respect to both concurring causes and successive
causes.6 Courts go so far as to exonerate defendants from having to pay for
harm that would have been duplicated by actual or potential future forc-
es.70 For example, a tortfeasor who permanently disables plaintiff only has
to pay for one year of disability if plaintiff suffers a permanently disabling
heart attack one year after the tortfeasor injured plaintiff."
A major exception to the corrective justice measure of damages is the
rule allowing full recovery from the sole tortfeasor in multiple sufficient
cause cases where the other sufficient cause was nontortious." Such cases
award plaintiff a windfall. The tort does not make plaintiff worse off when
the innocent force duplicates both harm and injury." Yet, plaintiff recovers
full compensation for the loss. This exception is a huge aberration. The
rare plaintiffs who recover under this exception are indistinguishable from
the legion of plaintiffs who routinely fail to recover for harm duplicated by
actual or potential innocent forces.7 4
The other major objective of tort law-efficient deterrence -also can-
not be advanced by imposing liability on a tortfeasor who made an insuf-
Weinrib, Towarda Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37,43 (1983) (using Kantian
principles); Wells, supra at 2353 (advocating adoption of procedures that encourage juries to
do justice in individual cases); see generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973) (contending that causation of harm is the basis for corrective
justice).
68 Fischer, Duplicated Harm, supra note I I, at 1136.
69 Id. at 1136, 1147.
70 Id. at 1136.
71 Id. at 1153-55.
72 See supra notes io-18 and accompanying text.
73 Fischer, Duplicated Harm, supra note I I, at 1164-65.
74 Id. at I165.
75 Richard Posner first explained the tort system "in ... terms of economic analysis,"
contending that efficient allocation of resources requires appropriate deterrence of accidents.
Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75
T~x. L. REV. 18oi, i8o6 (1997); see also Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL
STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interrst, 14
J.L. & ECON. 201, 209 (1971). Many other scholars have joined Posner in engaging in economic
analyses of tort cases. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987);
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ficient contribution to injury. There are two reasons why it is usually not
efficient to impose liability on a party for an injury he could not have pre-
vented. First, if the tortious conduct presents a risk of preventable injuries,
the risk of liability for those injuries provides sufficient deterrence. There-
fore, the added expense of litigating cases where the tortfeasor could not
have prevented the injury is wasted since the litigation will not reduce the
level of accidents. Second, holding tortfeasors liable for unpreventable ac-
cidents can lead to overdeterrence because the increased litigation costs, or
the increased scope of liability, can induce the actor to take actions that do
not optimize social welfare.!6
There is virtually no authority for holding a tortfeasor who makes an
insufficient contribution liable where the other contributions were nontor-
tious. Courts can impose liability only by expanding the rule permitting re-
covery where one of several multiple sufficient forces is innocent to include
multiple insufficient innocent forces as well. That rule is so completely out
of line with policy and precedent in analogous cases that courts should not
expand it.
b. Multiple Tortfeasors. -The weakest case for holding the insufficient
contributor liable where multiple tortfeasors are involved is one in which
one or more of the other tortfeasors' contributions were either necessary
or independently sufficient. Gibson v. Garcia" is an example. Defendant
utility company negligently permitted its utility pole to become rotten.
Defendant driver negligently drove into the pole knocking it over onto
plaintiff. The court held that the utility company would not be liable if the
collision would have knocked over a sound pole. Yet, if the pole broke at
the rotten place (rather than being knocked over entirely), the utility com-
pany's negligent maintenance contributed to the accident, even though the
contribution was insufficient to cause the accident.79 On the other hand,
the driver's contribution was both necessary and independently sufficient
for the accident if a sound pole would have broken at the same place due to
the driver's force. Holding the driver liable promotes efficient deterrence
because liability provides an incentive for him to invest in precautions that
would have prevented the accident. Holding the utilitz company liable
does not promote efficient deterrence. As stated above, the company is
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr, 43 U.
CHi. L. REV. 69 (1975); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs,
19j. LEGAL STUD. 691 (i9o).
76 The analysis establishing these points is elaborate. I have performed that analysis
elsewhere, and will not repeat it here. See Fischer, Causation, supra note 9, at 1364-77.
77 Gibson v. Garcia, 2 16 P.2d i 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
78 Id. at 123.
79 Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at s8oo.
8o See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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adequately deterred by the specter of liability in cases where its poor main-
tenance is necessary for injury.
Corrective justice considerations also suggest the utility company
should not be liable for two reasons. First, people may intuitively feel the
driver, not the utility company, is the responsible party. Causation and re-
sponsibility are linked concepts. In criminal cases, for example, unsuccess-
ful attempts are punished less harshly than successful attempts. Second,
the whole purpose of the corrective justice policy is to put plaintiff in her
prior position, and imposing liability on the driver accomplishes this at least
if the driver is solvent or has insurance. Justice does not require that the
utility company also compensate the plaintiff. Of course, the corrective jus-
tice argument for holding the utility company liable is much stronger if the
driver is judgment proof.
The rationale for liability is strongest in cases like TidalOilCo. v. Pease8
where multiple tortfeasors each make both unnecessary and insufficient
contributions. Liability promotes both corrective justice and deterrence. It
furthers corrective justice because damages are necessary to restore plain-
tiff to the position he would have occupied if no tort had occurred. It would
be unfair to allow each tortfeasor to escape liability by hiding behind the
culpability of the other tortfeasors. Liability promotes deterrence by giv-
ing each tortfeasor an incentive to avoid making a contribution to injury.
Economic theory supports liability because the only way to prevent the
accident is to deter a sufficient number of tortfeasors from acting. This is a
"simultaneous joint tort" where a fixed level of care bXy all (or most) of the
tortfeasors is required to prevent the injury and harm.
Additional policies might influence a court's decision to base liability
on insufficient contributions to injury. One such policy is the need to help
plaintiffs overcome impossibly difficult proof problems. The Restatement
reporters cite asbestos cases supporting the theory that asbestos exposures• - 83
insufficient to produce injury are causal. The reasoning in those cases sup-
ports the reporters' interpretation. Yet in mesothelioma cases that theory of
causal contribution is not firmly rooted in science, and courts may employ
the theory as a convenient means of reducing plaintiff's very difficult proof
problems.
We do not even know the mechanism by which asbestos fibers cause me-. 84
sothelioma. Science does not yet tell us whether mesothelioma requires
81 Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 5 P.zd 389 (Okla. 1931). For a discussion of Tidal Oil Co., see
supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
82 The analysis establishing this point is complex. It has been spelled out elsewhere and
need not be repeated it here. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, IIE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW I90-98 (1987); Fischer, Dupicated Harm, supra note I 1, at 1147-49.
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27, Reporters' Note
cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
84 Jane Stapleton, Lords A'leaping Evidentiary Gaps, Io TORTS L.J. 276, 28o (2002).
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a threshold dose of asbestos fibers8s or whether the disease is caused by a
single exposure to a single asbestos fiber.86 In the former case it is logically
possible for a court to find contributions of insufficient doses, prior to the
contraction of the disease, causal because they contributed to the disease. s
In the latter case this approach cannot work; only one fiber contributed to
the disease, and it was both necessary and independently sufficient for the
disease.B8 All the other fibers made no contribution.
The best reasoned asbestos opinions recognize proof of causation of
mesothelioma is impossible in multi-exposure cases because we do not• . 89
know enough about the etiology of the disease. Courts trying these cases
impose liability based on proof of increased risk of mesothelioma caused
by exposure to asbestos rather than on proof of causation of the disease.90
They do not impose liability based on insufficient contributions to injury.
Cases relying on insufficient contributions to harm adopt the premise
that a threshold dose of asbestos is required to cause the disease but hold
that once contracted the seriousness of the disease is not affected by ad-
ditional doses.9' These cases impose liability on defendants whose doses
were alone insufficient to cause the disease on the theory that each dose
nevertheless contributed to the disease.92 Yet the case support for that the-
ory of causation is equivocal. Many cases also exonerate defendants who
contributed only an "insignificant or modest dose" of asbestos.93 But these
defendants may have made suffjient, rather than insufficient, contributions
to injury since we know that even a "trivial exposure to asbestos" is suf-
ficient to cause mesothelioma.94
The asbestos mesothelioma cases may be based more on policy than
on causation. Asbestos manufacturers are culpable having clearly caused
much harm. Yet, proof of causation in individual cases is often impossible.
Allowing manufacturers to escape liability is unjust. Rather than requiring
85 Chris Miller, JudicialApproaches to Contested Causation: Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral
Services in Context, i LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 119, 128 (2002); Stapleton, supra note 84, at
28o-8i, 284-85.
86 Miller, supra note 85, at 128; Stapleton, supra note 84, at 280-81, 284-85.
87 RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 Reporters' Note
cmrt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219-20 (Cal. 1997);
Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., (2003) 1 A.C. 32,36 (H.L.)(U.K).
90 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 122o.
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 Reporters' Note
cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
92 Id.
93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 36, Reporters' Note
cmrt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
94 Stapleton, supra note 84, at 278.
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plaintiffs "to prove the unprovable,"9 ' courts have been creative in devising
theories to prevent injustice.
Policy rather than causal principles may explain the result of some
otherwise anomalous fraud cases. In these cases, reliance on a fraudulent
misrepresentation, united with other motives, caused the plaintiff to enter
into a disadvantageous business transaction. The courts required that the
misrepresentation be necessary for the loss (i.e., the plaintiff would not
have entered into the transaction but for the misrepresentation). 96 This
result is inconsistent with the rule that necessity is not required in the case
of multiple sufficient causes. Such cases clearly would not impose liability
on the basis of a misrepresentation insufficient to induce plaintiff's action.
Requiring necessity (rather than sufficiency or even insufficiency) is aberrant
if the deceitful action is based on the policy of preventing financial losses
resulting from bad decisions. The corrective justice and deterrence con-
siderations in the physical harm cases discussed above 97 would then apply.
But the physical harm cases are based on the policy of preventing and com-
pensating harm. These fraud cases would not be out of line if the courts
deciding them viewed deceit law as a tool for preventing interferences with
autonomy rather than preventing harm.
Fraud law may not be designed to prevent harm, e.g., financial losses
resulting from bad investment or business decisions. Rather, it may be
designed to prevent interference with personal autonomy.98 In our free
market economy we allow people the autonomy to make good or bad fi-
nancial decisions all the time. Autonomy is most clearly impaired when
the misrepresentation is necessary for harm (i.e., plaintiff relies on the mis-
representation to her detriment by making a bad decision she would not
otherwise have made). Here there is strong reliance and clear detriment.
Autonomy is less clearly impaired when the misrepresentation is sufficient
for harm (i.e, here reliance is strong but not detrimental because plaintiff
would have made the same decision due to the influence of other equally
sufficient considerations). Autonomy is hardly impaired at all when plain-
tiff relies on a misrepresentation insufficient to affect her decision as there
is no detriment and weak reliance. Thus, imposing liability for insufficient
misrepresentations would almost never be justified to protect autonomy.
An exceptional case, justifying liability, is where plaintiff detrimentally re-
lies on "multiple insufficient" misrepresentations. Consider the following
Restatement Illustration:
95 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSIcAL HARM § 27 Reporters' Note
cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. i, 2005).
96 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
98 See Alan Strudler, Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1546-51, 1567 (1998).
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A, B and C all make the same misrepresentation to D in order to induce him
to buy land. D buys the land. In deciding to do so, he is substantially influ-
enced by all three representations, although any two of them would have
been sufficient to induce him to act. A, B and C are all subject to liability to
D for pecuniary loss that he suffers through the purchase of the land.
99
Here, liability based on insufficiency is necessary to protect autonomy be-
cause all three insufficient causes combined to interfere with autonomy.
This is very different from the case where nontortious motives are neces-
sary and sufficient to induce plaintiff's behavior and these motives were
coupled with an unnecessary and insufficient tortious misrepresenta-
tion.
Not all misrepresentation actions protect autonomy. Tortfeasors who
make negligent misrepresentations that cause accidents, such as false as-
surances of safety, are liable for the harm they cause. Should tortfeasors be
liable for misrepresentations making unnecessary and insufficient contri-
butions to harm? Courts probably base liability in such cases more on the
policy of preventing harm than the policy of protecting autonomy. If so,
they should decide the question based on the other policy considerations
discussed earlier in this section rather than autonomy. Determining wheth-
er a contribution to injury is causal can be influenced by the underlying
purpose of the tort as well as by our abstract concept of causation. Not all
misrepresentation actions serve the same tort purpose.
IV. THE SECOND PROBLEM CASE: DEPENDENTLY
SUFFICIENT CAUSES
A. Background
In a previous article, I analyzed causation in fact in omission cases present-
ing the problem of dependently sufficient causes.'' I concluded that nei-
ther the but-for test nor the NESS test can reliably resolve the problem.'0 2
To decide such cases, courts must rely either on intuition about causation
or on policy. I also argued that policy is superior to intuition as a basis for
decision.
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1977).
ioo For a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between autonomy and causation,
see David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 605, 624-26,
645-50 (200).
ioi Fischer, Causation, supra note 9.
102 Id. at 1359-46o. For a description of the NESS test, see supra notes 19-23 and
accompanying text.
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In his recent article, Professor Richard Wright criticizes my analysis. '03
He sets forth an elaborate argument designed to show my claim is incor-
rect. ' °4 He claims in such cases his version of the NESS test provides both
the correct theoretical resolution and a resolution comporting with human
intuition about causation.105 In this section I criticize Professor Wright's
theory. I also cast doubt on his claims about intuition by presenting a sur-
vey of beginning law students revealing their views about causation in de-
pendently sufficient causation cases. I will address my points of agreement
and disagreement with Professor Wright for the purpose of clarifying this
very complex issue.
Dependently sufficient causes occur when the absence of the combined
intervention of two tortious acts or omissions is necessary to prevent an in-
jury. They commonly arise where one actor fails to provide a safety device
(or provides a defective safety device), the second actor fails to use the
safety device (or would not have used the device if it had been provided),
and an injury occurs that the use of an effective safety device would have
prevented. The injury can occur to either of the actors or to a bystander.
The difficult question is whether either or both of the actors caused the
injury resulting from the failure of the safety device to prevent the injury.
In order to separate causation issues from comparative negligence issues,
this article uses examples where a bystander is the injured person. The
following is a common example involving failure to use a nonfunctional
safety device:
Rental Car
C, an automobile rental company, negligently fails to discover and repair
the defective brakes on one of its cars. C rents the car to D who negligently
fails to apply the brakes in time to avoid an accident in which Pedestrian is
injured.'°6
i03 Wright, Once More, supra note 9.
io4 See id. at 1123-31.
IO5 See id. at i i29. In support of his own version of the NESS test, Professor Wright
wrote:
[Human intuition] about causation ... which would explain our common
judgments ... [concerning] causation in the double-omission cases [is
reflected in the NESS test] if the test is properly understood as incor-
porating a concept of causal sufficiency, which requires the complete
instantiation of the potentially applicable causal generalization, and if
proper attention is paid to the distinction between positive and nega-
tive causal effects and the need to take into account any causal prior-
ity within an applicable causal generalization when assessing negative
rather than positive causal effects.
Id.
io6 The hypothetical is based on Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 117 So. 72
(Ala. 1928).
2oo5-2oo6]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Failure-to-warn cases also commonly involve dependently sufficient
causes, as is illustrated by the following hypothetical:
Failure to Warn
A product manufacturer fails to put a required warning on a conspicuous
product label containing other warnings. The product user fails to read the
label, and harms a bystander by using the product in a way that would have
been prevented had the omitted warning been provided, read, and heed-
ed.
The failure-to-warn case is actually a variation of the problem of the
nonuse of a nonfunctioning safety device. The adequate warning--just
like automobile brakes-functions as a safety device. The warning empow-
ers the product user to use the product in such a way as to avoid injuring
the bystander.' °7 In essence, both the rental car hypothetical and the failure
to warn hypothetical are variations of the same problem. In this response, I
will focus on the rental-car hypothetical because Professor Wright did. My
points in response, however, are equally applicable to similar cases such as
the failure to warn hypothetical.
The problem presented by dependently sufficient causes has important
practical implications. People injured by~products sue manufacturers quite
frequently on a failure-to-warn theory. '° At the same time, product users
commonly fail to read product labels and owner's manuals. '°9 Thus, many
cases arise where product users fail to read allegedly inadequate warn-
110
ings.
107 E.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prod. Co., 818 P2d 1337 (Wash. 1991) (hold-
ing manufacturer liable for failing to provide a warning that would have instructed parents of
child who suffered brain damage as a result of aspirating baby oil to protect the child from
the risk.).
io8 See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODuCTs LIABILITY § 19.0111] (3d ed. 1994)
("The seller's duty to warn provides a theme that runs throughout the law of products liability.
Judging by the amount of litigation on the general issue during these ripening years of prod-
ucts liability law, the question occupies a central part of the battleground on which injured
consumers and sellers clash.").
IO9 James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability, io KAN. J.L. & Pun. PO'Y
21, 26 (2ooo) ("[Ylou cannot get out of a legitimate design defect case by plastering your prod-
ucts with warnings. The reason is, warnings are very often not followed. People do not read
them. People do not pay attention to them."); Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products,
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1219 (1994) ("Whether or not ideal consum-
ers 'should' examine all warnings and directions, the caselaw provides empirical support for
the conclusion that product users frequently do not read them.").
I to E.g., Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F3d 1329, 1333 (ioth Cir. 1996); Johnson v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1981); Sowles v. Urschel Labs. Inc.,
595 E2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. Bungee Int'l Mfg. Corp., 44 E Supp. 2d 534,
535 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Bushong v. Garman Co., 843 S.W.2d 807, 8xo (Ark. 1992); Cobb Heating
&Air Conditioning Co. v. Herton Chem. Co., 229 S.E.ad 681, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Safeco
Ins. Co. v. Baker, 515 So. 2d 655, 656-657 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
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The but-for test fails to satisfactorily resolve the rental car hypotheti-
cal set out above because application of the test implicates neither C (the
provider of the car) nor D (the driver of the car) as a cause of the harm to
the pedestrian. C did not cause it because even if the brakes had been in
working order, the accident would still have happened because D failed
to apply the brakes. Likewise, D did not cause the harm because, even if
she had applied the brakes, the accident would have happened since the
brakes were not in working order. The result seems wrong for two reasons.
First, it appears one or both of the omitters caused the harm because if
neither omission had occurred (the brakes were good and the driver used
them) the pedestrian would not have been harmed."' Second, it is unfair
to exonerate both tortfeasors at the expense of the innocent pedestrian. If
only one of the omissions occurred, that omitter would have been liable to
the pedestrian. Surely, it is unfair to allow each negligent tortfeasor to es-
cape liability by hiding behind the negligent omission of the other.'
2
In the rental car case, one could argue that courts should decline to
apply the but-for test by analogy to the multiple sufficient cause cases,
such as the two-fires case set out above. ' That is, successive omissions in
the rental car case are sufficiently analogous to simultaneous multiple suf-
ficient forces in the two fires case to be governed by the same exception.
The argument is supported by the same policy underlying the two fires
case: the unfairness of allowing C and D to each hide behind the other
with the result that the innocent pedestrian recovers from neither. The
argument leads to the determination that both omissions are causal. Yet this
solution may not be acceptable for two reasons.
First, the two omissions in the rental car case may not be sufficiently
analogous to the two fires. The fires are each independently sufficient to be
the but-for cause of the burning of the house if a negative fact is assumed,
the absence of the other fire. There is no need to create additional positive
facts. People can trace the series of events that actually occurred with re-
spect to each fire independently and conclude each fire contributed to the
result. But neither of the two omitted acts in the rental car case can be a
but-for cause of the harm to the pedestrian unless a fictitious positive fact is
assumed-that the other omitted act did occur. That is, the renter's failure
to repair the brakes could not be a but-for cause of the pedestrian's harm
unless the brakes had been applied by the driver (a positive fact that did
not occur). Likewise, the driver's failure to apply the brakes could not be a
but-for cause of the pedestrian's harm unless the brakes had been repaired
Inc., 978 P.2d 505, 510 (Wash. 1999).
iii Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at 1125.
112 For an elaboration on this corrective justice consideration, see Fischer, Causation,
supra note 9, at 138o-84.
113 See supra notes 1z- 16 and accompanying text.
0o5- 2oo6 ]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
(also a positive fact that did not occur). Thus, there is a conceptual differ-
ence between the two fires case and the rental car case because in the lat-
ter case there is no actual series of events linking the omitted act with the
harm. This difference may make it more difficult for one to find an intuitive
causal link between the omissions and the harm in the rental car case.
The second reason the analogy to the two-fires cases may not work is
that it may produce results courts are unwilling to accept. In some types
of dependently sufficient cause cases, courts tend to exonerate the first
omitter. The most common examples are products liability cases where
the manufacturer is sued for failure to warn, and the evidence shows the
user would not have read the warning. Courts frequently exonerate the
manufacturer because the failure to warn was not causal. ' 4 If these cases
are correctly decided, they cannot be explained by the exception to the
but-for test for multiple sufficient forces (which would hold both omitters
liable). The cases could be explained by the but-for test, but only if courts
are willing to exonerate both omitters. Cases deciding the liability of the
second omitter (the person who failed to read the warning) are too rare to
determine a judicial preference with respect to their liability.
The NESS test is a real contribution to legal analysis because it is an
extremely helpful way of visualizing the nature of causal problems. Pro-
fessor Wright claims the test does much more than this. He believes "the
NESS test... capture[s] the concept of causation that we tacitly employ in
all our (purely empirical) causal judgments."" 5 I believe the inability of the
NESS test to resolve successive omission cases like the Rental Car case
and the Failure to Warn case suggests that the NESS test, as elaborated by
Professor Wright, is not a test that can be universally applied to analyze all
causal questions. It is simply a tool helpful for analyzing some, but not all,
causal problems.
In the passage set out below, Professor Wright applied his test to the
rental car hypothetical and concluded the negligent driver caused the re-
sulting accident, but the negligent renter did not:
D's failure to try to use the brakes was necessary for the sufficiency of a set
of actual antecedent conditions that did not include C's failure to repair
the brakes, and the sufficiency of this set was not affected by C's failure to
repair the brakes. A failure to try to use brakes will have a negative causal
effect whether or not the brakes are defective. On the other hand, C's fail-
ure to repair the brakes was not a necessary element of any set of anteced-
ent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the injury.
Defective brakes will have an actual causal effect only if someone tries to
use them, but that was not an actual condition here. The potential negative
114 See supra note 11o and accompanying text.
1 5 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at 1107.
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causal effect of C's failure to repair the brakes was preempted by D's failure
to try to use them."
6
Professor Wright would reach his conclusion (the second omitter caused
the harm and the first omitter did not) in any case involving "nonuse or
misuse of a missing or defective safety device, unless the actor did not try
to use the device because he knew it was missing or defective.""..7
I criticized Professor Wright's analysis of the rental car case as not being
helpful because it can easily be reversed to produce the opposite conclu-
sion, that the first omitter caused the harm and the second omitter did not.
Thus, one could reverse Professor Wright's reasoning as follows:
C's failure to repair the brakes was necessary for the sufficiency of a set
of actual antecedent conditions that did not include D's failure to use the
brakes, and the sufficiency of this set was not affected by D's failure to use
the brakes. Leasing a car without having repaired the defective brakes will
have a negative causal effect whether or not the brakes are used. On the
other hand, D's failure to use the brakes was not a necessary element of any
set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of
the injury. Failure to use the brakes will have an actual causal effect only if
the brakes are in working order, but that was not an actual condition here.
The potential negative causal effect of D's failure to use the brakes was
preempted by C's failure to repair them. 
1
8
My second criticism pointed out that Professor Wright's analysis violat-
ed the NESS test principle that the NESS set be comprised only of "actual
conditions." I pointed out that Professor Wright's shifting use of the phrase
"actual conditions" enables this manipulation.
Professor Wright claims to be looking for actual events on which to con-
struct the appropriate set of antecedent causal conditions. In his rental hy-
pothetical, however, he assumes that C's failure to repair the brakes did not
occur because he excludes this omission from the pertinent set of actual
antecedent conditions. Subtracting this negative fact (failure to repair the
brakes) has the same effect as adding an imaginary positive fact (that the
car was equipped with good brakes). Failure to apply these good brakes
then becomes the cause of the accident. Thus, Wright's analysis is based on
an assumption that does not square with reality. The argument can be ma-
nipulated by assuming that the driver attempted to apply the brakes, that
is, excluding the driver's failure to apply the brakes from the set of actual
116 Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 18oi.
117 Id.
1 I8 Fischer, Causation, supra note 9, at 1358.
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conditions to which. the failure to repair the brakes belongs. The result is
that the renter, rather than the driver, caused the accident. " 9
Prior to responding to Professor Wright's reply, I should point out that in
his recent article he revised the statement of his NESS test in response to
suggestions provided in a very insightful article written by Professors Rich-
ard Fumerton and Ken Kress. 12 According to Professor Wright, in its "full
form," the NESS test now "states that a condition contributed to some
consequence' if and only if it was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of
existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the
consequence."' 2 ' The new statement of the test differs from the old by
requiring the condition to be "necessary for the sufficiency of a sufficient
set" rather than by requiring the "condition be a necessary element of a
sufficient set."'' 2 Professor Wright does not explain precisely why he made
the change. He continues to adhere to the "actual 6ondition" requirement
stating that "[tihe relevant notion of sufficiency is not merely logical or
empirical, but rather requires that each element of the applicable causal
generalization, in both the antecedent ('if' part) and the consequent ('then'
part) must have been in actual existence (concretely instantiated) on the
particular occasion." 1
2 3
B. Analysis
In his recent article, Professor Wright responds to my first criticism (the
NESS test can be reversed to show either omitter caused the harm) but
not to my second criticism (his analysis violates the NESS requirement
that the set contain only actual conditions). The core of Professor Wright's
criticism is that my reversal of the NESS test resulted from a mechani-
cal application of the NESS test that required "mere analytical or empiri-
cal sufficiency."' 124 My misapplication of the NESS test resulted from my
failure to understand three points: First, the NESS test incorporates "a
concept of causal sufficiency, which requires the complete instantiation
of the potentially applicable causal generalization;"'' 25 second, I failed to
pay "proper attention ... to the distinction between positive and negative
i19 Id. at 1359.
12o Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation andthe Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency,
and Causal Sufficiency, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (2001). Professor Wright thanks Professors
Fumerton and Kress for pointing out the need for the refinement. Wright, Once More, supra
note 9, at 1103 nn.l112-13.
T21 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at 1102-03.
122 Id. at i io3 n.112.
123 Id. at 1103.
124 Id. at 1129.
125 Id.
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causal effects;16 and third, I failed to "take into account any causal priority
within an applicable causal generalization when assessing negative rather
than positive causal effects."' I reply to these criticisms below.
Professor Wright's first two points (the need for "causal sufficiency" and
the failure to distinguish between "positive and negative causal effects")
are related. He claims that an independently sufficient act, omission, or
condition is causal if and only if it is "actually sufficient" rather than an act,
omission, or condition that merely "would-have-been sufficient (preempt-
ed)." 128 That is, in applying the test, one must make "sure that a condition
or set of conditions which seems to have been sufficient actually fully exist-
ed and was sufficient, rather than having had its potential causal effect pre-
empted by some other condition or set of conditions."'' 29 Professor Wright
quotes John Stuart Mill for the proposition that "[a]ll effects are connected,
by the law of causation, with some set of positive conditions," and that they
almost always also require negative conditions as well, i.e., "the absence
of preventing or counteracting causes."" 0 Consequently, the absence of a
positive or negative preempting condition is necessary for causation.
Professor Wright uses the two-fires case to illustrate the necessity of
describing conditions as independently sufficient conditions only if they
are part of actually sufficient sets of conditions--ones that have not been
counteracted (rendered insufficient) by positive or negative conditions. He
states:
The NESS test can be used, and implicitly is used, to confirm the indepen-
dent sufficiency of each fire in cases such as Kingston, in which the two large
fires merged to burn down the plaintiff's house. Each fire was necessary for
the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that contained it
but not the other fire. The two sets overlap to a considerable extent, since
they share such existing necessary conditions as oxygen, fuel to burn on the
route to the house, lack of a downpour, the fire's reaching the house while
there is still a house left to burn, etc. Since the set containing each fire was
fully instantiated, the two fires are duplicative causes of the destruction of
the plaintiff's property.
On the other hand, if one of the fires arrived first and burned the house
down before the second fire arrived, only the first fire was independently
sufficient. It was necessary for the sufficiency of an actually sufficient set
that contains it but not the second fire. The second fire was not indepen-
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 11o9.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1129 (quoting 3 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, ch. V, § 3 (8th ed.
1872)) (emphasis added).
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dently sufficient, since the set containing it but not the firgt fire was not
fully instantiated. Remember that sufficiency means complete instantiation
of the applicable causal generalization for destruction of the house by a fire.
That causal generalization includes, as a necessary element, the fire's reach-
ing the house while there is still a house left to burn. That element was
instantiated, along.with all the other elements of the causal generalization,
for the set that includes the first fire but does not include the second fire.
It was not instantiated for the set that includes only the second fire. The
second fire would have been sufficient if the first fire had not existed, but
it was not actually sufficient since the first fire did exist and preempted the
potential causal effect of the second fire. ,3'
Figure I illustrates why, under the NESS test, the fire that arrives first is
causal and the other is not. Each of the two overlapping circles represents
a set containing only one fire.
Under Professor Wright's FIGURE I
analysis, "the fire's reaching
the house while there is still
a house left to burn," is aposi-
tive condition required to be
included in the set in order FIRE A
to prevent the fire from being
preempted as a cause of the
house burning down. 32 For
this reason, in Figure I the
set containing Fire B is causal
and the set containing Fire A Fuel on way to house
is not. The "lack of a down-
pour" is a negative causal ef- Lack of a downpour
fect that is necessary for the
sufficiency of the set.' 33 This
negative condition is repre- House still standing
sentative of a huge number
of other negative conditions FIRE B
necessary for the sufficiency
of the set, but which can-
not be specified for practical
reasons.'M Other negative conditions include the absence of a flood extin-
guishing the fires, the absence of a firefighter extinguishing the fires, the
131 Wright, OnceMore, supra note 9, at 1104 (citing Kingston v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co.,
211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Fumerton & Kress, supra note 12o, at 98-99.
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absence of a safety device extinguishing the fires, etc. Professor Wright
refers to all such negative conditions in a set as the "omnibus negative con-
dition, the absence of any 'preventing or counteracting' cause." ,'
35
Because the NESS test requires the set to include the absence of all
"preventing or counteracting" causes, I believe my second criticism, de-
scribed above, (that Professor Wright's analysis of the rental car case vio-
lates the NESS requirement that the set contain only actual conditions)
remains valid. In the two-fires case, there really was an absence of a down-
pour that would have extinguished the fires. This negative causal effect
had to be included in the set because it was essential for the destruction of
the house by fire. One cannot eliminate the reality that there was no down-
pour without creating an actual downpour. Changing reality by assuming a
nonexistent downpour-that negates causation by burning-is not permis-
sible under the NESS test because the set must include only actual condi-
tions. In the rental-car case, the failure to repair the brakes is a negative
causal effect (a preventing or counteracting cause) that actually occurred.
If the failure to repair had not taken place, the brakes would have been
repaired, and applying them would have prevented the accident. The ficti-
tious brake repair converts the driver's failure to apply the brakes from an
omission that made no difference into an omission that was a but-for cause
of the accident. The assumption that the brakes are repaired represents a
change in reality not permitted by the terms of the NESS test.
To put the point differently, in order to use the NESS test to prove the
failure to apply the nonworking brakes contributed to the harm, our task is
to construct a set wherein the failure to apply the nonworking brakes was
necessary for the sufficiency of a set that was sufficient for the occurrence
of the harm. But this is impossible. Failure to apply nonworking brakes was
not necessary for the sufficiency of the set. It is only the failure to apply
working brakes that is necessary for the sufficiency. Assume a set contain-
ing the following elements: car moving toward plaintiff; car does not turn;
plaintiff does not get out of car's path; driver fails to apply nonworking brakes.
The set is sufficient to cause plaintiff's injury, but the failure to apply the
nonworking brakes is not necessary for the sufficiency. The injury will oc-
cur even if the driver does apply the useless brakes. The only way to make
the failure to apply the brakes necessary for the sufficiency of the set is to
exclude the adjective "nonworking" from the set for the purpose of imply-
ing that the brakes work.'36 But according to Professor Wright, removing a
preventing or counteracting cause is not permissible:
135 Wright, Once Mor, supra note 9, at H 30.
136 If we wanted to construct a set showing that applying "working brakes" contributed
to "a car stopping," we could do so. The set would include both the "driver's applying the
brakes and the brakes' being in proper working order"; both of these conditions are "neces-
sary positive conditions" for the sufficiency of the set. See Wright, Once Mor, supra note 9, at
1 130. Professor Wright uses this set as the basis for his argument that the failure to apply the
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[W]hen applying the NESS test one must always double-check to make
sure that the actual conditions that are excluded from the description of the
supposedly sufficient set of actual antecedent conditions do not in fact un-
dermine the sufficiency of the described set by preventing the instantiation
of one or more of the necessary elements in that set.
t7
i. Causal Sufficiency v. Empirical Sufficiency. -Professor Wright criticizes
my use of the phrase "multiple-sufficient-cause" to describe all overdeter-
mined-cause cases as "inaccurate and highly misleading" 3 because:
This phrasing is appropriate only when all the acts or omissions were (du-
plicative) actual causes, but not when one preempted the potential causal
effect of the others, as when one fire arrived and burned down a house hours
before the second fire arrived. Although the second fire would have been
sufficient to burn the house down if the first fire had not already destroyed
the house, it was not actually sufficient because the first fire had already
destroyed the house.' 39
I understand this criticism to be based on a distinction Professor Wright
makes between "empirical" sufficiency and "causal" sufficiency.'4 "Em-
pirically" sufficient conditions include those that merely "would-have-
been sufficient" if they had not been preempted.' 4' On the other hand,
"causally" sufficient conditions are those that "actually fully existed" and
were sufficient because they were not preempted,' 42 i.e., the "omnibus
negative condition, the absence of any 'preventing or counteracting' cause,
was not satisfied." 
43
brakes has "causal priority" over the failure to repair the brakes. Id. at 113o. He uses causal
priority to supplement the NESS test. I discuss the causal priority argument later in this paper.
Seesupra notes 149-56. and accompanying text. My point here is simply that Professor Wright
has not shown us how to construct a NESS set showing that "the failure to apply non-working
brakes" contributed to "the failure of the car to stop."
137 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at I 116 n.156.
138 Id. at 126.
139 Id.
14o Id. at 1129 (Professor Wright states that the NESS test fails to capture intuition
about causation only if "the NESS test is viewed 'mechanically' as requiring mere analytical
or empirical sufficiency. But it is not true if the test is properly understood as incorporating
a concept of causal sufficiency, which requires the complete instantiation of the potentially
applicable causal generalization....").
141 Id. at i io9 (Professor Wright states that in applying the NESS test one must make
"sure to distinguish actually sufficient conditions from mere would-have-been sufficient (pre-
empted) conditions. Make sure that a condition or set of conditions which seems to have been
sufficient actuallyfully existed and was sufficient, rather than having had its potential causal effect
preempted by some other condition or set of conditions." (emphasis added)).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1130.
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Professors Fumerton and Kress elaborate on the distinction between
causal sufficiency and empirical sufficiency.' 4 Employing this distinction,
it may be possible to identify both the failure to repair the brakes and the
failure to apply the brakes as being "empirically sufficient." This is because
an accident is destined to happen every time one or both of those failures
occur, as long as the failure (or failures) occurs in a situation where the
effective use of brakes is necessary to prevent the accident. The critical
question is whether it is possible to go further and identify one of those
omissions but not the other, as "causally" sufficient because it "preempts"
the other omission. The analysis set out below questions whether it is hu-
manly possible to do so in an objectively defensible manner. If we can only
identify instances of causal sufficiency-as distinct from empirical suffi-
ciency-by declaring they exist, it is a concept of little practical value.
When analyzing the rental-car hypothetical, Professor Wright insists the
failure to try to use the brakes preempts the failure to repair the brakes. He
states:
The absence of any causally prior necessary condition [failure to try to use
the brakes] preempts the possible coming into play (through presence or
absence) of any other necessary condition in the causal generalization [fail-
ure to repair the brakes], the operation of which was causally subsequent to
or dependent upon the causally prior necessary condition.'
45
Although Professor Wright does not explicitly spell out his reasoning pro-
cess, I believe his analysis to be based on the idea that the failure to repair
the brakes is preempted because the failure to repair the brakes is suffi-
cient to cause the accident only in the "would-have-been sufficient" sense
(empirical sufficiency), i.e., the failure to repair was preempted by the
"negative causal effect" of the failure to apply the brakes. Therefore, causal
sufficiency is lacking because there was no "set of existing antecedent con-
ditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence." ,46 Or, to
put the point differently, "an element of the applicable causal generaliza-
tion [an attempt to apply the brakes was not] in actual existence." 47
Note that Professor Wright's preemption analysis in the two fires case
(illustrated by Figure i) is very different than his preemption analysis in
the rental car case. In the two-fires case, preemption by Fire B is based on
the outcome occurring before the cause of interest (Fire A) is in place. But
that did not occur in the rental-car case. There, Professor Wright focuses on
the order of the omissions coming into play to find preemption.
144 Fumerton & Kress, supra note i 2o, at 92-95. They use the label "lawful" sufficiency
("related in a law-like manner") to describe the kind of sufficiency that Professor Wright de-
nominates "empirical" sufficiency. Id. at 92-95, 10 1-102.
145 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at 1130-3 .
146 Id. at 1128, 1130-31.
147 Id. at 1 103.
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In the rental-car case, Professor Wright appears to argue that the failure
to apply the brakes has a negative causal effect preventing the failure to
repair the brakes from coming into play.18 Yet a good advocate for a plain-
tiff in a suit against the rental car company would argue just the opposite.
The failure to repair the brakes has a negative causal effect that prevents
the failure to apply the brakes from coming into play. The failure to re-
pair the brakes preempted the failure to apply the brakes because without
good brakes an accident caused by a failure to stop became inevitable at
the moment the car was given to the Driver rendering any failure to ap-
ply the brakes completely irrelevant. We know this accident was inevitable
because causation is determined in hindsight. For purposes of determin-
ing causation it does not matter whether the accident was foreseeable in
advance.
So far we have what appears to be nothing more than examples of good
advocacy. Each side adopts a characterization of the problem leading to
the conclusion they desire. They argue the point to the judge or jury, and
the lawyer with the most persuasive argument prevails. Figure 2 demon-
strates that the key to the characterization used in these arguments lies in
selecting the place to begin the analysis. Figure 2 is a time line (moving
left to right) for the collision in the rental car case. Plaintiff's lawyer begins
the analysis of the problem at the time of the negligent repair and argues
the subsequent failure to apply the brakes is irrelevant and therefore pre-
empted. Professor Wright begins the analysis at the time when the driver
fails to apply the brakes and argues this omission preempts the misconduct
that preceded it (the failure to repair) by rendering it irrelevant (it never
came into play).
Professor Wright, however, claims there is more to this than good advo-
cacy. He asserts there is one clearly correct answer: the failure to apply the
148 Professor Wright states:
However, when the situation is one in which we are attempting to iden-
tify the causes of the brakes' not being operated-that is, a failure of the
causal generalization for braking, which is a "negative causal effec'... the
causal priority becomes significant and must be taken into account when
applying the NESS test. The failure of any causal generalization is logi-
cally or empirically guaranteed to occur if any one of the necessary posi-
tive conditions in the antecedent of the causal generalization is absent.
Yet, the failure can be explained causally only by taking into account
any relevant causal priority among those positive conditions. The absence
of any causally prior necessary condition preempts the possible coming into play
(through presence or absence) of any other necessary condition in the causal gen-
eralization, the operation of which was causally subsequent to or depen-
dent upon the causally prior necessary condition.
Id. at 1130-31 (emphasis added).
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FIGURE 2
RENTAL CAR TIME LINE
Failure to repair Necessity to stop Failure to apply Collision
brakes brakes
brakes is causal and the failure to repair is not. This is because the failure
to apply the brakes has "causal priority." ,49 He explains:
The causal sequence for the operation of a safeguard is initiated when a
person attempts to use the safeguard and then subsequently proceeds, as a
result of such attempt, with the activation of the safeguard if the safeguard
is present and in proper condition. That is, the activation of the safeguard
depends on someone's first attempting to use it, so that if no such attempt
is made, "the temporally first omission [the failure to provide a working
safeguard] is not causal because it never came into play."' '
I believe his analysis to be as follows: both applying the brakes and
having them in good working order are necessary fortheir successful opera-
tion.'"' Because of his notion of causal priority, the necessary condition of
applying the brakes is causally prior to the necessary condition of having
brakes in good working order, and thus a failure to apply the brakes pre-
empts the failure to have good working brakes.
But surely the plaintiff suing the rental company will argue that the
"causal sequence for the operation of a safeguard is initiated when" the
safeguard is repaired to an operable condition. When viewed in this man-
ner, the "causal priority" moves forward from the time of the repair. If
causal priority moved forward from the repair, then in our example the
first negative causal effect (failure to repair) would be the cause because it
preempts the occurrence of the second negative causal effect (failure to ap-
ply the brakes). From this perspective, it is irrelevant to the causal inquiry
whether or not the driver applies the (useless) brakes.
Professor Wright's notion of when the causal sequence begins is quite
rational. At least in the context of the rental car hypothetical, I believe there
are other people who share his view. But what is this notion of causal prior-
ity based on? There are two possibilities: either it is based on a causal law
or it is based on intuition about causation. If causal priority is a causal law,
149 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at 1129.
15o Id. at 1128 (quoting Fischer, Causation, supra note 9, at 1361)
151 Id. at 1130 (Professor Wright states: "In the usual case in which the brakes are suc-
cessfully operated, both the driver's applying the brakes and the brakes' being in proper work-
ing order are concrete instantiations of different necessary positive conditions in the com-
pletely instantiated causal generalization for braking, and thus are NESS causes (and, in this
situation, also but-for causes) of the successful operation of the brakes.").
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then Professor Wright's analysis suffers from a serious deficiency pointed
out by Professors Fumerton and Kress. In their analysis of the NESS test,
Fumerton and Kress pointed out the inadequacy of "empirical" sufficiency
(which they refer to as "lawful" sufficiency) as a tool for explaining preemp-
tion.152 They suggested the NESS test might better explain preemption if
Professor Wright used "causal" sufficiency instead.'53 They identified a ma-
jor objection, however, to the use of causal sufficiency:
We must recall that Wright's project is to analyze the meaning of the word
or, alternatively, the concept of causation. If he deploys the concept of a
causal law in defining causation, surely his critics will charge him with a vi-
cious form of circularity-his NESS test for causation is nearly tantamount
to defining causation as causation.
Professor Wright is caught between a rock and a hard place. To avoid the
charge that he cannot handle certain cases of causal preemption, he must
come up with a way to distinguish lawful (or law-like) sufficiency from
causal sufficiency without relying on the concept of causation, a task that
has eluded all philosophers to date.' s4
If Professor Wright's claim is that causal priority is a causal law, then
his reasoning does appear circular because he merely asserts the existence
of the causal law. He does not explain the source of the causal law or how
others might verify its existence. In essence, he would be claiming the
second omission is the NESS cause because the second omission caused
the accident.
2. Intuition About Causation. -On the other hand, Professor Wright's con-
cept of causal priority might not be a causal law at all. It might just be in-
tended to reflect intuition about causation. If there is indeed a predominant
intuition about causation, I have no objection to courts formulating rules of
law to reflect that intuition. My earlier article, however, was skeptical about
the existence of a commonly held intuition, and the article stated a bias for
deciding such cases on the basis of policy rather than intuition.'*5 Yet, I rec-
ognize that law must reflect community values. If intuition is sufficiently
uniform and sufficiently strong, I am willing to concede the law should
reflect that intuition. An excellent recent article summarizes empirical evi-
dence about how people view causatin.6 The studies show that people
152 Fumerton & Kress, supra note 12o, at 89.
153 Id. at 84,Io2-o5.
154 Id. at 102.
155 For a discussion of the policy considerations relevant to deciding such cases, see
Fischer, Causation, supra note 9, at 1364-84.
156 Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between Counterfactual
("But For") and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors' Decisions,
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have a well-established concept of causation. The concept is affected by
many factors such as necessity, sufficiency, directness, remoteness, tempo-
ral sequence, etc. '
Is there a commonly held causal intuition reflecting Professor Wright's
concept of causal priority? I conducted an empirical study designed to help
answer this question. In my study, first-semester, first-year torts students
responded to a survey. The survey was submitted to the students at the
very beginning of their first torts class, before the students were introduced
to any principles of tort law. Three of the survey questions dealt with the
influence of causal priority on the student's views of causation. Each stu-
dent was given, and answered, only one of the three survey questionnaires.
Between z6 and 3 1 students answered each of the three questionnaires.
Two of the questions involve situations where Professor Wright claims
causal priority plays a role. These questions involve two omissions, where
one omission must take place before the other omission. These questions
are based on the rental-car hypothetical and the failure-to-warn hypotheti-
cal set out earlier. The third questionnaire is based on the following hypo-
thetical which Professor Wright cites as an example of a multiple omission
case not involving causal priority:
Two Switches
"Suppose that two switches need to be turned off in order to avert a fire,
and that X has a duty to turn off one, Y the other but neither does so and
a fire which would have been averted had they both performed their duty
breaks out."'s8
Professor Wright concludes each failure to throw the switch is a duplica-
tive cause of the fire because there is no causal priority in this hypotheti-
cal.' 9 "There is no such causal priority in the two-switches case, in which
the operation of each switch is not dependent on the prior operation of the
other switch, but rather each switch operates independently of the other
switch." *6
The survey responses to the two-switches case verify Professor
Wright's conclusion that people intuitively believe both omissions are
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2o01).
157 Id. at 246-47.
158 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at H 127.
159 Id. at 1131 ("On the other hand, if, as in the two switches hypothetical, there is no
causal priority among the multiple absent necessary conditions, then each absent necessary
condition is a duplicative cause of the failure of the causal generalization.").
i6o Id. at i128.
161 The two-switches survey:
In answering the following question, circle the answer that you believe
is most correct. Please circle only one choice.
Two switches (switch A and switch B) must be thrown to prevent a boil-
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causal. 2 Nineteen of the twenty-six respondents concluded each failure to
throw the switch caused the fire (choice 3). The other seven respondents
concluded neither omission was causal (choice 4).
The responses to the other two questionnaires show the requirement
that one omission must take place prior to the other does influence peo-
ple's views of causation. The responses fail, however, to show that intuition
is influenced in a consistent manner by this factor. Furthermore, only a
minority of people who responded to both questionnaires share Professor
Wright's view that the second omitter, and not the first omitter, caused the
injury.
In the rental-car questionnaire,'6 3 thirty students responded. The larg-
est number of respondents (thirteen, or 43%) thought both the failure to
er fire. The sequence in which the switches are thrown does not matter
as long as they are both thrown. Company A is responsible for throwing
switch A. Its employee negligently failed to throw switch A. Company A
is responsible for the negligence of its employee.
Company B is responsible for throwing switch B. Its employee negli-
gently failed to throw switch B. Company B is responsible for the negli-
gence of its employee.
The boiler fire broke out and destroyed the property of Company C.
Company C sues both Company A and Company B for negligently caus-
ing the boiler fire.
The cause of the boiler fire was:
i) Company A's failure to throw switch A.
2) Company B's failure to throw switch B.
3) Both tie failure of Company A to throw switch A and Company B to
throw switch B.
4) Neither the failure of Company A to throw switch A nor Company B
to throw switch B.
Please briefly explain your reasoning.
162 Wright, Once More, supra note 9, at 1127.
163 The rental-car survey:
In answering the following question, circle the answer that you believe
is most correct. Please circle only one choice.
An accident occurred when a delivery truck collided with a taxi cab,
causing damage to the cab. Ready Truck Rentals, Inc. rented the truck
to United Delivery, Inc. for use in United's delivery service. The brakes
on the truck were completely inoperable due to a defect, and would not
have slowed or stopped the truck if they had been applied. Ready's me-
chanic was negligent in failing to discover and repair the brake defect.
Ready is responsible for the negligence of its mechanic.
United's driver obtained the truck from Ready and drove the truck off
of the Ready parking lot onto a street. The truck collided with the taxi
cab while the cab was legally stopped on the street at a stop light a short
distance from the Ready parking lot. There was adequate time to stop
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repair the brakes and the failure to apply the brakes caused the accident
(choice 3). Only ten respondents (33%) concluded the second omission
(failure to apply the brakes) by itself was causal (choice 2). The smallest
number of respondents (7 or 23%) thought the first omission (failure to
repair the brakes) by itself was causal (choice i). If, as Professor Wright
suggests, there is a predominate intuition that the second omission by itself
was causal, one would expect at least a majority (sixteen) of the respondents
would have selected choice 2. That only ten of the respondents selected
choice 2, therefore, is inconsistent with Professor Wright's suggestion. The
discrepancy between ten and sixteen respondents selecting choice 2 is sta-
tistically significant.'6
Curiously, the responses to the failure-to-warn questionnaire were
significantly different. Thirty-one students responded. The largest num-
a vehicle with proper brakes prior to hitting the cab. United's driver,
however, negligently failed to apply the truck brakes prior to the colli-
sion. The driver did not know that the brakes were inoperable because
the driver had no occasion to use them prior to the collision. United is
responsible for the negligence of its driver.
The taxi company sues Ready Truck Rentals and United Delivery for
negligently causing damage to the taxi.
The cause of the collision was:
I) Ready's failure to repair the brakes.
2) United's failure to apply the brakes.
3) Both the failure to repair the brakes and to apply the brakes.
4) Neither the failure to repair the brakes nor the failure to apply the
brakes.
Please briefly explain your reasoning.
164 X_(1)=9.351, p<.05. This article considers a discrepancy to be "statistically signifi-
cant" if the statistical test used indicates that the likelihood that the discrepancy would oc-
cur by chance is less than 5% (reported by the p-value as p< .05). See generally BARBARA G.
TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989).
165 The failure-to-warn survey:
In answering the following question, circle the answer that you believe
is most correct. Please circle only one choice.
Damage occurred when an aerosol spray paint can that had been thrown
into the trash exploded when the trash was being burned. Company A
manufactured and sold the can of spray paint. It placed a very conspicu-
ous warning label on the can that warned about the risk of inhaling paint
fumes, and instructed how to apply the paint safely. The label contained
no warning that exposing the can to fire could cause the can to explode.
The failure to include such a warning on the label was negligent.
Company B purchased the aerosol paint can from Company A. After
using the paint, Company B's painter threw the empty can into a bin
of trash that the painter knew was to be burned. Company B's painter
negligently failed to read the warning label on the can prior to using or
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ber of respondents (fourteen or 45%) concluded the first omission (failure
to put the warning on the label) was by itself causal (choice i). Only one
respondent (3%) believed the second omission (failure to read the warning
label) was by itself causal (choice 2). Ten respondents (32%) believed both
omissions were causal (choice 3), and six respondents (19%) concluded nei-
ther omission was causal (choice 4). As stated above, if there is a common
intuition that the second omission by itself was causal, one would expect
at least a majority (sixteen) of the respondents would have selected choice
2. That only one of the respondents selected choice 2, therefore, is starkly
inconsistent with Professor Wright's thesis. The discrepancy between one
respondent and a majority of respondents (sixteen) selecting choice 2 is
statistically significant.
The responses to the rental car questionnaire and the failure-to-warn
questionnaire do not support the notion that the predominant intuition is
that the second omission was causal because the first omission was pre-
empted. The rental car survey itself shows substantial disparity of views,
with only 33% of the respondents believing the second omission and not
the first omission was causal. The results of the failure-to-warn survey
show substantially different results, with only one respondent (3%) believ-
ing the second omission rather than the first was causal. I do not claim my
modest survey definitively establishes intuition about causation in depend-
ently sufficient cause cases. The survey suggests, however, that intuition is
inconsistent and varies according to context. I remain unconvinced that
intuition about causal priority is sufficiently uniform and fixed to justify a
hard and fast rule that in successive omission cases the second omission is
causal because it preempts the first omission.
The survey instruments permitted the respondents to make comments
explaining the reasons for their choices. In examining those comments, I
disposing of the can. Company B is responsible for the negligence of
its painter.
When the trash was burned, the can exploded and caused damage to the
property of Company C. Company C sues Company A and Company B
for negligently causing damage to its property.
The cause of the explosion was:
i) Company A's failure to give a warning about the risk of explosion.
2) Company B's failure to read the warning label on the can.
3) Both the failure to warn about the risk of explosion and the failure to
read the label.
4) Neither the failure to warn about the risk of explosion nor the failure
to read the label.
Please briefly explain your reasoning.
166 X_(1)=4.821,p<.05.
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could find no explanation for why so many students viewed the warning
case differently than the rental car case.
V. CONCLUSION
The great bulk of tort cases raise no theoretical problems concerning cau-
sation in fact. A typical automobile accident case often creates proof prob-
lems concerning the source and nature of the victim's injuries but does not
require an analysis of the meaning of cause. No test of causation is really
needed in such routine cases. The but-for test, however, does adequately
explain them. This experience with easy cases can lead us to assume there
are no difficult theoretical causation issues in tort law. The assumption is
wrong.
Multiple sufficient causes, exemplified in this article by the two-fires
hypothetical, do raise difficult theoretical issues. Courts resolve these is-
sues in a way counter to the results produced by the but-for test. The
NESS test represents an advance in legal theory because it provides an
explanation for what the courts have done. It also provides a useful way
for visualizing the causal role of insufficient forces. Yet it is a mistake to
conclude the NESS test, or any test, can definitively resolve all theoreti-
cal causation issues, including when liability is appropriate for insufficient
causal contributions to harm. Courts can only decide the issue by resorting
to intuition or policy. Policy considerations will usually support liability for
an insufficient contribution to harm only when the other forces at work
are also insufficient and tortious. From a doctrinal point of view, courts can
make the liability decision either as a matter of causation or as a matter of
some other tort doctrine, such as proximate cause. For practical, rather than
theoretical reasons, it is desirable for courts to make those decisions by
relying on noncausal doctrines.
The NESS test also cannot definitively resolve dependently sufficient
successive omission cases. They raise more than simple fact questions.
They require judgments about responsibility. The necessity of making
these judgments renders it impossible to resolve the cases mechanistically
by the use of formulas. The cases illustrate the way difficult causation in
fact issues blend into questions of duty and proximate cause
While I applaud the use of devices such as the but-for test and the
NESS test to clarify our thinking about cause, I cannot believe we will ever
be able to develop a mechanical test that will satisfactorily resolve difficult
issues such as those discussed in this article.
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